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Risky future relationship predictions 
By Ferry Biedermann, freelance journalist working both in the UK 
and in Europe. He has contributed to the Financial Times, CNBC, 
the Washington Post, Trouw newspaper in the Netherlands and 
many others. He is also a former correspondent in the Middle 
East for the FT and Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant. 
Six weeks in, post-Brexit Europe looks and feels remarkably like pre-
Brexit Europe, with ongoing uncertainty about the future relationship 
between the EU and the UK and posturing over negotiations. 
Time, I say arbitrarily, for risky predictions about how it’s all going to 
shape up. I normally hesitate to do this since my record is spotty, to 
say the least. But I’m coming off the high of correctly predicting the 
Boris landslide, and who saw that one coming? Now is not a time for 
shrinking violets, even though, to paraphrase the movie Tropic of 
Thunder, you should never go full-pundit. 
Domestic politics will no doubt determine the final stance of each of 
those involved and, while the larger EU countries along with Ireland 
will likely shape any future deal, it will have to be ratified by all 
remaining EU member states, a process that has occasioned 
notorious surprises in the past. Public opinion has an important role to 
play in the ratification process, as could be seen in the las-minute 
protests against the EU-Canada, CETA deal. A UK deal might receive 
closer scrutiny. 
The UK position of wanting to ‘take back sovereignty’ and refusing the 
authority of EU courts, in such things as dispute resolution, could 
have the opposite effect for both the EU and the UK: ceding authority 
to arbitration panels and tribunals that may not be as shady as some 
contend they are but that will certainly not be as transparent as the 
current EU judicial system. 
To get an understanding of what might occur, it’s maybe helpful to 
take some of the utterances from the main players on face value, 
however preposterous that notion might seem at first. To give a recent 
example from the side of the British Prime Minister; when he said he’d 
get rid of the backstop, he in fact did, by reverting to a position that 
had been on offer from the EU from the beginning and that’s more of 
a threat to the unity of the United Kingdom. 
Seen from the EU’s side, it also largely stuck to its guns: it had said 
there could be no re-negotiation of the withdrawal agreement, and 
although it technically did renegotiate, that was mostly on the issue of 
the backstop, where it got what it had originally on the table. 
Regulations. 
Let’s start with the most obvious UK position: no alignment with EU 
rules and regulations after the end of the transition period. First of all, 
whatever the invective of the moment, the UK is likely to maintain 
alignment where it is in its interests, maybe without calling it that. But 
that will not mollify the EU side. Recent remarks by French president 
Emanuel Macron that the EU should be firmer on this point, are moot 
because it is clear that the UK will not strike the kind of deal that will 
make it possible for the EU to insist on alignment. 
Everybody knows what this means: an end to frictionless trade and a 
much more intrusive inspection regime in the Irish Sea, as GB-origin 
commerce will not be able to pass freely into the EU. This is also the 
point where conflict resolution mechanisms will have to be put into 
place that have the potential to undermine democratic control. 
The obverse is the more nebulous EU position of not wishing to have 
a Singapore-on-the-Thames on its doorstep, never mind the twisted, 
originally Brexiter, analogy with hyper-regulated Singapore. It has long 
been clear that if the UK wishes an arms-length relationship with the 
EU, it cannot expect unfettered access to the largest trading bloc in 
the world. Nor can it expect to be taken into account when the EU 
forges ahead with its own domestic social-economic agenda, which 
extends to environmental, labour, judicial and other realms. 
Barring a miracle, the UK will remain tethered to the European 
mainland and the largest slice of its trade will remain with the EU, 
meaning that it will have to meet many of the EU’s standards, or be 
barred from trading. The EU will make sure to have mechanisms in 
place to force compliance into the future. This is likely to be a deal-
breaker. 
Freedom of movement. 
This was supposedly one of the main issues precipitating Brexit but 
one that successive UK governments have used to whip up 
sentiments rather than a realistic stumbling block in relations with the 
EU. Even under EU-rules, the UK could have done much more to 
limit, or keep track of, certain types of migration. This is not a hill on 
which EU-negotiators will choose to die. 
It is almost entirely a domestic UK matter and one on which the 
government seems to have no firm stance, despite the Home 
Secretary’s trenchant remarks. Geography is even more important 
here, with travel in all likelihood remaining relatively free and even 
labour continuing to move between the EU and UK. 
The f-words: fishing and finance. 
The stances on fishing and finance are muddled on both sides of the 
Channel. Here, the UK again has a strongly emotive domestic issue 
but unlike with freedom of movement it also holds a strong card: the 
EU craves continued access to its waters. Finance, on the other hand, 
is important to the UK economy and needs access to the EU. 
Despite the occasional blast of rhetoric from either side, it’s not 
unthinkable that, as has already been suggested, fishing and finance 
will be linked and a deal will be worked out that guarantees continued 
access in both sectors. But UK financial firms are then likely to be 
dependent on EU-member state courts for conflict resolution, not what 
Brexiters had in mind. And the EU will attempt in the long term to 
undermine the dominance of the City. 
EFTA, EEA, Canada etcetera. 
Time has long past since even re-joining EFTA was feasible, given 
the UK position, let alone agreeing to the EEA’s single market 
mechanism. A Canada-type trade deal is equally far-fetched, though, 
partly because of geography, as in fishing, and because of numbers, 
as in finance, services and even goods. Besides, let’s take the 
Johnson government’s pronouncements on face value again: the UK 
is moving away from the EU, not closer to it, as Canada is. 
With the EU still set against sector-by-sector deals and the UK against 
extending the talks, we’re looking at a very-partial-deal muddle and 
the rest on WTO-rules, i.e. no deal, by the start of 2021. 
 
